The One-Year Clause of the Statute of Frauds in South Carolina by Pope, William L.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 10 Issue 4 Article 7 
Summer 1958 
The One-Year Clause of the Statute of Frauds in South Carolina 
William L. Pope 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William L. Pope, The One-Year Clause of the Statute of Frauds in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.R. 703. (1958). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
LAW NOTE
THE ONE-YEAR CLAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Since the enactment of the Statute for the Prevention of
Frauds and Perjuries in England in 1677, it has been of con-
tinuing importance, especially in the law of contracts. Al-
though the content and language of the Statute of Frauds as
originally enacted and as reenacted in the states of this coun-
try vary only slightly from state to state, the interpretation
given the Statute by the courts has differed in many instances.
When one considers the time which has elapsed since its adop-
tion by the individual states and the vast number of cases
requiring construction of the Statute over this period, this
variation is understandable. Perhaps another reason for the
differences in interpretation has been the strong inclination
of the courts to give effect to the intention of the contracting
parties wherever possible. Since the Statute of Frauds results
in a disregard of intention when the language used by the
parties brings the contract within its scope, the courts in some
jurisdictions have been hesitant to apply the Statute where
effect could be given to the intention of the parties, even if
this called for a most stringent construction of the language
of the Statute.
The number of decisions appearing in the South Carolina
reports is ample evidence that the Statute of Frauds must be
taken into account when the question of enforceability of any
contract arises. The purpose here is to take the fifth clause
of the fourth section of the Statute as it exists in South Caro-
lina, and to show, through a review of the South Carolina
cases, how the court has interpreted the language of that
clause.
The fifth clause of the fourth section of the Statute states:
No action shall be brought whereby: ... (5) To charge
any person upon any agreement that is not to be per-
formed within the space of one year from the making
thereof [italics added] ; Unless the agreement upon which
such action shall be brought.., shall be in writing...
1. CODE OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-101 (5).
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" • .. ANY AGREEMENT .. . "
From the language " . . .any agreement... ", it would
seem that the Statute should be applicable regardless of the
particular subject matter involved, if the agreement fell with-
in the fifth clause. While the other provisions of the fourth
section relate to the subject matter of the contract, the clause
here under consideration relates to the period of the perform-
ance.2 Oral contracts for employment, services, insurance,
and payment of money have been involved most often in the
application of the fifth clause, but the South Carolina Court
has also applied the Statute to a contract for hire of a slave,3
and in a recent case, 4 the Court, for the sake of argument,
applied this clause to an oral warranty of goods sold.
Where the agreement by reason of the nature of the subject
matter is within another clause of the fourth section, such as
agreements in consideration of marriage and agreements re-
lating to transfers of real estate, courts in some jurisdictions
have held it thereby excluded from operation of the fifth
clause even if found not to violate the other clause.5 The effect
which certain statutes relating to real property have upon
the fifth clause of the Statute of Frauds when both are in-
volved in a transaction will be discussed later, but suffice it
to say at this point that the mere fact that an agreement
relates to land does not make the fifth clause inapplicable
in South Carolina.0 Mutual promises of marriage which do
not involve a marriage settlement are not within the marriage
clause7 of the fourth section. A few courts, due to the special
2. BROWNE, THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 272.
3. Compton v. Martin, 5 Rich. 14 (S. C. 1851).
4. Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S. G. 105, 77 S. E. 2d 583
(1953).
5. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 57 (1943). Lewis v. Tapman, 90
Md. 294, 45 AtI. 459 (1900) (breach of promise of marriage); Sullivan
v. Bryant, 40 Okla. 80, 136 Pac. 412 (1913) (promises relating to real
estate).
6. See Hillhouse v. Jennings, 60 S. C. 392, 38 S. E. 596 (1901);
Hampton Park Terrace v. Sottile, 102 S. C. 372, 86 S. E. 1066 (1915). It
should be noted that some authorities are to the effect that where there
has been part performance sufficient to remove an oral contract for the
sale of land from the land clause of the Statute, specific performance
will be decreed notwithstanding the fact that the contract may also be
one that is not to be performed within the year. Since the doctrine of
part performance is generally held to be applicable to proceedings in
equity only, and then only to the land clause of the Statute, it is not
discussed here. The above situation, however, may be one in which the
one-year clause of the Statute is inapplicable to contracts involving real
estate. There are no South Carolina cases on this point. 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 494 (rev. ed. 1936); 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 459 (1950).
7. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-101 (3).
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character of these contracts, have also excluded them from
operation of the fifth clause." This, however, seems not to
be the rule in South Carolina. The fact that the contract in
regard to marriage is excluded from the marriage clause of
the Statute would not, by reason of its subject matter, be
excluded from operation of the Statute of Frauds as an agree-
ment not to be performed within the year.9 Professor Willis-
ton's view is that any contract if not performable within a
year falls within this clause of the Statute, whether or not
also objectionable under another clause.' 0 This interpretation
is the one apparently followed in South Carolina.
"... NOT TO BE PERFORMED... "
The language of the Statute, "... not to be performed ...
has met with almost literal interpretation in all jurisdic-
tions." Courts have construed these words in their strictest
sense, and unless a contract unequivocally cannot be per-
formed within a year, it does not come within the purview of
this clause. This has undoubtedly been the long-time position
of the South Carolina courts. In an 1831 decision, 12 the Court
said that the Statute was applicable " . . . only to contracts
wholly executory and not intended, on either part, to be per-
formed within a year." The mere fact that performance with-
in a year is improbable or almost impossible is not sufficient
to bring the contract within the fifth clause: the agreement
must be one that cannot possibly be performed within a year
from its making.' s A clear example of the type of contract
that comes within the Statute was before the Court in the
case of Duckett v. Pool.'4 There A and B entered into an
oral contract in November, 1888, whereunder B was to be em-
ployed by A for the year 1889. Obviously the contract could
8. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 461 (1950).
9. Coggins v. Cannon, 112 S. C. 225, 99 S. E. 823 (1919).
10. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 501 (rev. ed. 1936); See RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 192, comment a (1932).
11. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 444 (1950); 49 Am. Jun., Statute of Frauds
§ 23 (1943).
12. Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. Cas. 5 (S. C. 1831).
13. Florence Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313
(1935).
14. 33 S. C. 238, 11 S. E. 689 (1890). See also Dukes v. Smoak, 181
S. C. 182, 186 S. E. 780 (1936) (oral contract of employment made in
May to commence in September and run nine months); Hillhouse v.
Jennings, 60 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599 (1901) (oral contract entered into
prior to November 21 for one year's employment to begin on November
21); Mendelsohn v. Banov, 57 S. C. 147, 35 S. E. 499 (1900) (oral
contract of employment made in July to commence in October and to
last for one year).
19581
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not be fully performed by either party until the end of the
year 1889, a date more than one year from the time the con-
tract was made. There can be no doubt, as this case shows,
that contracts for a year's employment to begin at a future
date are within the Statute.
If, however, the agreement does not affirmatively show that
the performance of it is projected forward more than a year,
it is not an agreement that cannot be performed within a
year.' r In one case 16 it was said that this clause refers only to
agreements which expressly stipulate that performance is not
to take place within the year, and in still another case'7 it is
said that there must be a negation of the right to perform
within a year to bring the agreement within the Statute. Al-
though seemingly very strict, this latter requirement is not to
be taken as requiring negative expression. Since very few
contracts set out the time for performance in negative terms,
it would seem that where the parties expressly agree that
performance is to take place after the year, this in effect
negates the right to perform at an earlier date. Certainly a
contract for two years is a negation of performance within
the year.18
In Jones v. McMichael9 there was an oral agreement be-
tween A and B under which A was to erect and maintain a
steam saw mill on the lands of B and B was to deliver, at
his own cost, all the timber growing on a certain tract of land
belonging to B. There was no time specified for performance.
In holding the agreement to be within the Statute, the Court
said:
The agreement contains no express reference to time,
but under it the business was carried on for more than a
year, and not half the timber was sawed or even felled.
If it appeared, as we assume it did, from the quantity
of the timber and the capacity of the mill, that the parties
in their agreement, contemplated the lapse of one year
before the enterprise could be fully executed, then the
agreement was obnoxious to the Statute.
A later case"0 referred to the decision in Jones v. McMichael
15. Parham v. Ins. Co., 111 S. C. 37, 96 S. E. 697 (1918).
16. Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strob. 196 (S. C. 1848).
17. McGehee v. S. C. Power Co., 187 S. C. 79, 196 S. E. 538 (1938).
18. Duckett v. Pool, 33 S. C. 238, 11 S. E. 689 (1900); Dukes v. Smoak,
181 S. C. 182, 186 S. E. 780 (1936).
19. 12 Rich. 176 (S. C. 1859).
20. Walker v. RR Co., 26 S. C. 80, 1 S. E. 866 (1887).
[Vol. 10
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as relaxing so much of the rule previously established by the
cases which required that it appear within the agreement
that it was not to be performed within a year. The effect
of Jones v. McMichael is to bring within the operation of the
Statute contracts which do not expressly place performance
beyond the year, but where it clearly appears from the sur-
rounding circumstances that it was within the contemplation
of the parties that performance would extend beyond the
year.
All the cases mentioned represent existing authority in this
state. It would seem, therefore, that in South Carolina, im-
possibility of performance within a year must be present to
make the one-year clause applicable, but it is sufficient in
a given case that impossibility of performance was within
the contemplation and intention of the parties.
The interpretation given this particular language of the
fifth clause by the Court is of sufficient importance to war-
rant an examination of specific instances where it has been
applied.
I. Contracts Which Do Not Fix Time for Performance
It is well established that where no time is fixed by the par-
ties for performance of their agreement, and performance
is possible within the year, the Statute does not apply.21 Thus,
if A orally promises to marry B, and no time is set for the
marriage, the case is not within the Statute.22 It is possible
that the marriage might take place within the year. The prob-
lem arises most frequently in oral contracts of employment, 2
but the same rule would seem to apply regardless of the type
of agreement involved.24
II. Contracts for Employment for Life, Indefinite Employ-
ment, Permanent Employment
Contracts for permanent employment,2 5 indefinite employ-
21. 49 AM. Jur., Statute of Frauds § 27 (1943).
22. Coggins v. Cannon, 112 S. C. 225, 99 S. E. 823 (1919).
23. Batesburg Cotton Oil Co. v. Jones, 96 S. C. 148, 80 S. E. 86 (1913);
Parham v. Ins. Co., 111 S. C. 37, 96 S. E. 697 (1918) (although involving
a written memorandum).
24. G. H. Crawford Co. v. Dixon, 22 F. Supp. 636 (E. D. S. C. 1938)
(contract by a bank to purchase bonds for the joint account of itself and
another).
25. Weber v. Perry, 201 S. C. 8, 21 S. E. 2d 193 (1942).
1958]
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ment,20 or employment for life,2 7 are not within the Statute.
The Court reads into such contracts an intention on the part
of the parties that employment is to last during the lifetime
of the employee, and the contract would be regarded as fully
performed if the employee died during the year.28 The possi-
bility that death could occur at any time is sufficient to re-
move the contract from the operation of the Statute. This
is true no matter how unlikely it appeared that death might
occur within a year after the contract was entered into. In
McGehee v. Power Co., in consideration of a lifetime job, the
plaintiff gave the defendant a release from liability for in-
juries plaintiff had received while employed by the defendant.
In allowing plaintiff to recover in a suit for breach of con-
tract, the Court flatly stated: "Where an oral agreement of
employment in terms provides for its continuance during the
lifetime of the employee, the contract is not within the Stat-
ute." 20 The breach in this case occurred one and a half years
after the contract was made, and it would appear that since
the possibility of death made it a contract that could be per-
formed within the year, it is immaterial how long the contract
actually extends.
30
III. Contracts Performable on Death
Although the principle of law applied by the courts is the
same, there is a clear distinction between the type of contract
just discussed and one which is to be performed on the death
of one of the parties. In the previous group of cases, perform-
ance is to continue until one's death, while here performance
is not to take place until one of the parties dies. Cases involv-
ing contracts of the latter type are, however, decided on the
same theory as those involving lifetime employment. The
fact that death might occur within the year is sufficient to
place the agreement outside the Statute.30 It is immaterial,
26. Cline v. RR Co., 110 S. C. 534, 96 S. E. 532 (1918); McGehee v.
S. C. Power Co., 187 S. C. 79, 196 S. E. 538 (1938); McLellan v. Mc-
Lellan, 131 S. C. 245, 126 S. E. 749 (1925); Weber v. Perry, note 25
supra.
27. McGehee v. S. C. Power Co., 187 S. C. 79, 196 S. E. 538 (1938).
28. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 54 (1943) ; see 2 WMLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 495 (rev. ed. 1936).
29. Differentiated from Stuart v. RR Co., 164 S. C. 283, 162 S. E. 348
(1931), on the ground that in the Stuart case no release was offered in
evidence and the contract was too uncertain. The Stuart case seems to
hold that a contract for permanent employment is within the Statute.
If so, it is opposed to the other cases.
30. Weber v. Perry, 201 S. C. 8, 21 S. E. 2d 193 (1942).
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therefore, when in fact death actually occurs. Where a father
transferred chattels to his son in exchange for the son's oral
promise that on his father's death he would pay a sum of
money to each of his two sisters, the agreement was not
within the Statute even though death did not occur until
eleven years thereafter."'
It was definitely established in one case that an oral agree-
ment to make a will is a contract performable on the death
of the promisor and therefore not within the Statute.32 In
reaching this decision, the Court expressly overruled an earlier
case33 which had held such agreement to be obnoxious to the
Statute.34 The life expectancy of the party may be more than
a year and such may be the anticipation of the parties, but
since death is possible within the year the agreement is with-
out the Statute.35
IV. Contracts the Performance of Which Is Dependent on a
Contingency
It is well settled that where performance depends on the
happening of a contingency which may or may not occur
within the year, the agreement is not within the Statute.30
As has already been seen, contracts for life, for permanent
employment, and contracts to be performed at the death of
one of the parties are not within the Statute because death
may occur within the year. In the one case the contract will
be regarded as fully performed and in the other death will
make performance due immediately. Although the courts
in some cases refer to these contracts as dependent on the
contingency of death, they are to be distinguished from the
type of contingency we are here considering. By definition a
contingency is a chance occurrence, and since death is a cer-
tainty - only its time being uncertain - such contracts have
been referred to as performed or performable on death and
not as contingencies.
The type of contingency that is of concern here is illus-
trated by the case of Gadsden v. Lance.37 There the plaintiff
31. Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strob. 196 (S. C. 1848).
32. Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757, 76 Am. ST. REP.
580 (1900).
33. Izard v. Middleton, 1 DeS. 116 (S. C. 1785).
34. See 9 Selden Society 10 (June 1948).
35. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 54 (1943); Jones v. McMichael,
12 Rich. 176 (S. C. 1859) (dicta).
36. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 495 (rev. ed. 1936); 49 AM. Jup., Stat-
ute of Frauds § 31 (1943) ; 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 54 (1943).
37. McM. Eq. 87 (S. C. 1841).
19581
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orally promised to transfer his right of subscription to one
hundred shares of new stock of a local bank to the defendant,
as soon as the books were opened for subscription and the
defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain sum per share.
The books were opened two years later, and the plaintiff sub-
scribed for one hundred shares and tendered an assignment
which the defendant refused to accept. Although the actual
opening of the books took place two years after the agree-
ment, it was held that the Statute was not applicable. The
Court found that the opening of the books was a contingency
upon which performance was dependent and that such open-
ing could have occurred within the year. The Court said:
".... when the agreement is to be performed on a contingency,
which may or may not happen within the year, a note in
writing is not necessary, unless it appears from the agreement
that it was to be performed after the year." The contingency
rule has also been applied to a promise to pay a sum of money
when all suits against a bank were ended,38 and to a promise
to pay a certain amount when a specific purchase was made
by the plaintiff.39 In any situation, however, where perform-
ance is dependent on a contingency which might occur within
a year, it cannot be said that the contract is one which is
not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof.
40
Oral agreements to insure for a period of more than a year
are prime examples of the application of this rule. It cannot
be questioned that such agreements are not within the Statute
of Frauds. 41 This seems obvious since by the terms of the
contract a contingency may occur within the year which will
require full payment on the part of the insurer. "The parties
do, indeed, contemplate that the contract is to remain in force
for more than a year, in case the contingency does not sooner
occur. But it may sooner occur; and in that case full per-
formance is required at once." 42  This view was clearly
adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in a 1945 de-
cision.43
38. Oswald v. Lawton, 187 S. C. 42, 196 S. E. 535 (1938).
39. Hill v. Smith, 12 Rich. 698 (S. C. 1860).
40. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 445 (1950).
41. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 495 (rev. ed. 1936); See Annot., 92
A. L. R. 232 (1934).
42. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 445 (1950).
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A situation closely analogous to the insurance cases ap-
peared in Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co.44 This case involved
an oral warranty of the safety of goods on sale. In effect it
was a representation that a certain pressure cooker sold by
the defendant would not explode. Assuming for the sake of
argument that such warranties were within the scope of the
one-year clause of the Statute, the Court held that this agree-
ment was nevertheless dependent upon a contingency which
might occur within a year and it was therefore outside the
Statute. The Court said that the warranty could be inter-
preted as an undertaking that " . . . the pressure cooker is
not dangerous and will not explode. If it does explode, we
shall indemnify you or be responsible in damages." That the
explosion of the pressure cooker did not in fact occur until
almost two years after the sale was immaterial, because the
contingency might have occurred within the year.
The Court, in the Joseph case, recognized a definite distinc-
tion between an oral warranty, which is in effect a promise
to indemnify the purchaser for damages sustained, and an
oral promise to repair extending beyond the year. This latter
situation confronted the court in the case of Rowland v.
Buck. 4 5 There was a written lease for seven years with an
oral agreement on the part of the landlord to keep the prem-
ises " . . . at all times in repair and in a safe and suitable
condition for the purposes for which said premises were
leased." The oral agreement to repair was held to be within
the Statute. The agreement itself did not mention what was
to be the duration of the duty to repair, but from the sur-
rounding circumstances it obviously was to be coextensive
with the seven-year lease. The agreement contemplated a con-
tinued and repeated course of positive action for seven years
and was therefore within the one-year clause of the Statute.
The difference between such a contract and one involving an
oral warranty is clear: the one contemplating continuous per-
formance in excess of the year; performance of the other
depending upon a contingency which might cause perform-
ance to be due within a year.46
V. Contracts Which Allow Alternative Performances
Where the agreement allows alternative performances, it
44. 224 S. C. 105, 77 S. E. 2d 583 (1953).
45. 150 S. C. 490, 148 S. E. 49 (1929).
46. See United Merc. & Mfrs. v. S. C. Elec. & Gas Co., 113 F. Supp.
257 (W. D. S. C. 1953).
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is not within the Statute if any of the alternatives can be fully
performed within a year.47 Since the parties provide that
the performance of any one of the alternatives will satisfy
the contract, it cannot be said that the agreement cannot be
performed within a year. This point was clearly before the
Court in the case of Elkins v. Plywood-Plastic Corp.48 There
the defendant was to furnish plaintiff with two sawmills for
three years " . . . and/or for so long a period as would be
necessary to cut and/or saw timber on tract." The Court in
holding this contract not to be within the Statute said that it
did not appear from the contract that it could not be per-
formed within a year. In so holding the Court implicitly rec-
ognized, if not expressly, that if one alternative may be per-
formed within the year the agreement is enforceable even
though the other alternatives may clearly be within the Stat-
ute. The problem is more complicated when although there
are no alternative performances, there is a right reserved to
one of the parties to terminate the contract. Of course where
the contract is not within the Statute, the mere fact that it
is made defeasible will not cause the Statute to be applicable.
Since contracts for permanent employment, indefinite employ-
ment, and employment for life are not within the Statute,
clearly contracts for permanent employment or for so long
as one's work is satisfactory49 or indefinite employment that
is subject to termination by either party5" would not be af-
fected by the Statute either.
The majority of courts hold that where a contract is one
that is not to be performed within a year, an option to termi-
nate does not take it out of the Statute even though the option
may be exercised within the year.51 The reason given is that
the Statute contemplates full performance and where the par-
ties agree on a term longer than one year, the fact that one
may be excused from further performance by exercising this
power to terminate is not sufficient to take the contract out
of the Statute. 52 There is some doubt as to whether South
47. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 454 (1950); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 498
(rev. ed. 1936) ; 49 Am. JuR., Statute of Frauds § 25 (1943).
48. 219 S. C. 296, 65 S. E. 2d 243 (1951).
49. McGehee v. S. C. Power Co., 187 S. C. 79, 196 S. E. 538 (1938);
Cline v. R. Co., 110 S. C. 534, 96 S. E. 532 (1918).
50. Weber v. Perry, 201 S. C. 8, 21 S. E. 2d 193 (1942).
51. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 498 (rev. ed. 1936); 49 Am. JuR., Stat-
ute of Frauds § 33 (1943); 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 48 (1943).
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Carolina is in accord with the majority view. In Walker v.
Railroad Company5 3 there was an oral agreement whereby
plaintiff was to furnish the defendant timber and other ma-
terials. There was no specified time for performance, but
the contract was to continue until plaintiff was notified to
stop. The Court held that since time for performance was in-
definite, the agreement was one which could be performed
within the year. This in itself was sufficient ground for the
opinion, but the Court went further and said:
There was not only no specified time fixed for the per-
formance of the contract, but it manifestly rested wholly
on a contingency. The Railroad Company had authority
to terminate it whenever it pleased by simply notifying
the plaintiff to stop delivering the material. It depended
wholly upon the will of the company whether the contract
should terminate at the end of a month or two months
or at the end of a year. Such a contract surely cannot
be regarded as an agreement not to be performed within
a year from the making thereof.
It would seem then, that this case was decided on tvo dis-
tinct grounds: (1) that the time for performance was in-
definite and therefore not within the Statute; and (2) that
even if the agreement was one that could not be performed
within the year, the fact that one party had the power to
terminate would be sufficient to exclude the Statute. Pre-
sumably this case could be cited as authority for placing South
Carolina in accord with the minority view. A later South
Carolina case,54 though not involving the Statute of Frauds
here under discussion, could possibly throw some doubt on
this construction of the Walker case. The case involved a
written lease which was to continue from year to year unless
one of the parties would give six months' notice of intention
to terminate. The Court said :5
This lease required notice to terminate it, and without the
intervention of the acts of the parties, the lease should
continue indefinitely from year to year, and the parties
would act under it, not by virtue of a renewal, but by the
continued obligation of the original lease. The lease is,
therefore, a lease for more than a year.
53. 26 S. C. 80, 1 S. E. 866 (1897).
54. Hampton Park Terrace v. Sottile, 102 S. C. 372, 86 S. E. 1066
(1915).
55. See 1 S. C. L. Q. 119, 142 (1948).
19581
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No mention was made of the Walker case in this latter opin-
ion. The case is doubtful authority on the precise point in
question inasmuch as the Court was interpreting a written
lease, and its comments, although clearly in point, were made
in determining whether or not a third party could avail him-
self of a recording act. Although the language used in the
Walker case may represent the minority view, it is certainly
not an impractical one, since where an agreement expressly
provides that one party shall have the right to terminate,
thereby bringing an end to the agreement, it would seem that
the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract that
could be performed within the year. 6
The courts generally hold, although there is authority to
the contrary, that an oral contract for a year or less with an
option to renew is not within the Statute.57 This seems to be
the more logical view in that the option may not be exercised,
and if it is not, complete performance as required by the
contract will be accomplished within the year.5 8 No South
Carolina case can be found dealing with the application of the
Statute of Frauds to this type of agreement. However, if it
is confronted with the problem, perhaps the Court will find
the prevailing view to be consistent with its application of the
Statute to other situations. 59
VI. Oral Lease for One Year to Begin in Future
As has been seen, an oral contract for a year's service to
begin at a future date is obnoxious to the Statute because full
performance is impossible within a year from its making. A
different result, however, has been reached in South Carolina
in situations which involve not only the one-year clause of
the Statute of Frauds but also statutes applicable to oral leases
of real estate. The first South Carolina case to involve this
problem was Hillhouse v. Jennings.0 After discussion of the
then applicable code sections in regard to leases and the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds, the Court held in effect
that when a tenant enters under a parol lease for a year, the
66. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 450 (1950).
57. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 64 (1943); Annot., 111 A. L. R.
1105 (1937).
58. 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 450 (1950).
59. See 1 S. C. L. Q. 119, 138 (1948). This article cites Rainwater
v. Hobeika, 208 S. C. 433, 38 S. E. 2d 495 (1946), as holding to the con-
trary. In the Rainwater case, however, both the lease and the option
were in writing, and the decision was based on notice and agreement to
fix rent.
60. 60 S. C. 392, 38 S. E. 596 (1901).
[Vol. 10
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss4/7
LAW NOTE
lease as such being valid, he has a right to possession for
twelve months from the time of entry. However, the Court
expressly stated: "If a landlord refuses to permit a tenant
to enter on the premises under a parol lease, no action shall
be brought to charge him upon such contract, even if the lease
is not for a term exceeding twelve months." The Court there-
by imposed the one-year clause upon an otherwise effective
oral lease. The necessity as laid down in the Hillhouse case,
of the tenant's entering into possession under the parol lease
was raised by Justice Cothran in a dissenting opinion in a
later case.6' In this case, however, the majority opinion de-
clared the law of the Hillhouse case to be that a parol lease
for a period not exceeding one year, commencing at a future
date, is not within the Statute of Frauds.
Whatever conflicts of opinion which may have existed
earlier, the law in South Carolina was definitely settled in
Wright v. Ritz Theatre Co.62 The Court in construing the
Landlord-Tenant Act of 194663 reasoned that since the Act
included no requirement that the length of a lease be cal-
culated from the date it was entered into and in view of
the prevailing custom in making such leases, the tenant is
entitled to possession for one year under an oral lease. This
three-to-two decision was to the effect that an oral lease for
a term not exceeding one year is valid regardless of when the
term is to commence. The Court said:
In only rare cases does the lessee take possession simul-
taneously with the making of the lease. It is unfair to
infer that the legislature, with knowledge of these facts,
intended to make a parol lease for a term of one year en-
forceable only in the event that the lessee was permitted
by the landlord to enter into possession.
For all practical purposes it can be said that oral leases for
one year to begin in the future have been excluded by the
South Carolina Legislature from the operation of the one-year
clause of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion is not un-
like that of a great many other jurisdictions.64
61. Nat'l. Bank v. People's Groc. Co., 153 S. C. 118, 150 S. E. 478
(1929).
62. 211 S. C. 161, 44 S. E. 2d 308 (1947).
63. CoDE OF LAWS OF Sou n CAROLINA, 1952 § 41-51: "A tenancy for
not to exceed one year may be created by oral agreement." § 41-52:
"Any agreement for the use or occupation of real estate for more than
one year shall be void unless in writing."
64. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 63 (1943); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 501 (rev. ed. 1936); Annot., 111 A. L. R. 1465 (1937).
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VII. Contracts Performable Within a Year by One Party
But Not by the Other
The American Law Institute takes the view that "[w] here
any of the promises in a bilateral contract cannot be fully per-
formed within a year from the time of the formation of the
contract, all promises in the contract are within Class V
[of the Statute]".65 This also appears to be the majority
view, that is, if performance on either side is to exceed or
take place beyond a year, the Statute is applicable, even
though performance on the other side is to take place within
the year.60 This is not, apparently, the view in South Caro-
lina. At an early date,67 the Court declared:
This clause of the Statute was intended to be applicable
to contracts wholly executory and not intended, on either
part, to be performed within a year. In other words, both
the consideration and the promise must be executory, and
neither to be done or performed within a year.
This principle has been approved in later cases.68 In Mendel-
sohn v. Banov 9 the Court said:
It will take the Contract out of the Statute, if it be in-
tended that either side shall perform its part within a
year; there must be an intent that there is not to be
complete performance on either side within a year.
The doctrine of full performance on one side removing the
bar of the Statute will be discussed later, but it is clear from
these cases that even if there has not been full performance
on one side, yet if it was intended within the year, the Statute
does not operate.
"... WITHIN A YEAR FROm THE MAKING THEREOF."
It is uniformly held that the one-year period intended by
the Statute looks to the day the contract is made and not to
the day on which performance actually begins or is intended
to begin.70 The general view taken by the American Law
Institute7' is that fractions of a day are disregarded in the
65. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198 (1932).
66. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 456 (1950); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 504
(rev. ed. 1936).
67. Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. Cas. 5 (S. C. 1831).
68. Compton v. Martin, 5 Rich. 14 (S. C. 1851); Carter v. Brown, 3
S. C. 298(1871).
69. 57 S. C. 147, 35 S. E. 499 (1900).
70. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 444 (1950); 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of
§ 43 (1943).
71. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198, comment d (1932).
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way most favorable to the enforceability of the contract.
Therefore, where employment for one year is to begin on the
day following the agreement, the agreement is not within the
Statute because performance will be completed on the day
exactly one year from the date of the agreement.7 2 There is
little doubt that a contract for a year's employment to begin
on the day of the contract is not within the Statute, but there
are a few courts which compute the time strictly and count
fractions of days.7 3 South Carolina does not as yet seem to
have passed on the matter, although there is authority which
favors the general proposition disregarding fractions of a day
in other situations.
7 3 '
Where a contract for a year's employment is to begin in
futuro the contract is within the Statute, but if the parties
on the day the employment is to begin make a restatement of
the contract, the new agreement is enforceable.74 One of the
leading cases on this point was decided by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in 1913. 7 5 In holding that the restatement of
the terms made the contract enforceable, the Court said:
... there is no authority to which we have been referred
and nothing in law that suggests itself to this Court
that prevents the parties, who have made the contract
that is void as to form, from curing the formal defects.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to go into what con-
stitutes a sufficient restatement of the terms, but mention
is only made to point out that it may be used in some cases
to prevent the application of the Statute of Frauds to an
otherwise enforceable contract.
PERFORMANCE As REMOVING CASE FROM THE ONE-YEAR
CLAUSE
The extent to which performance, partial or total, takes an
agreement out of the Statute varies With the particular Stat-
utes of Frauds, and with its particular subdivisions as in
72. 2 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 502 (rev. ed. 1936); 2 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 444 (1950) ; 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 62 p. 570 (1943).
73. See 2 W MLISTON, CONTRACTS § 502 p. 1463, n. 3 (rev. ed. 1936).
73a. See Callahan v. Hallowell, 2 Bay 8 (S. C. 1796); S. C. Nat. Bank
v. Guest, ____ S. C. -, 102 S. E. 2d 215 (1958).
74. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 62 p. 570 (1943); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 503 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198 illus.
7 (1932).
75. Catlett v. Burke, 96 S. C. 363, 80 S. E. 610 (1914) ; see also Crosby
v. Bradley, 142 S. C. 386, 140 S. E. 702 (1927).
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the case of the fourth section.7 6 The fourth section is con-
cerned only with executory contracts. Therefore, when there
has been complete performance on both sides, the Statute has
no application. 7 Although the contract was originally within
the Statute, after its complete performance the Statute cannot
be used to undo what has been done. The more difficult prob-
lem is determining what performance other than complete
performance on both sides will remove the bar of the Statute.
It is clear that the performance sufficient to invoke the equi-
table doctrine of part performance is not such performance
as will take a contract out of the one-year clause.78 Since the
doctrine of part performance is an equitable doctrine, it is
not included in this discussion.79 We are here concerned only
with the effects of the one-year clause on suits for breach of
contract and other law actions.
The great weight of authority is to the effect that full per-
formance on one side, especially where it takes place within
the year, will remove an agreement from within the Statute.80
There is no doubt in South Carolina that where full perform-
ance on one side takes place within the year the fifth clause
is not applicable.8' In Bates v. Moore8 2 there was an oral
agreement whereby defendant agreed to purchase at a sher-
iff's sale three slaves belonging to plaintiff, and to pay a
certain sum of money in cash at the sale and the remainder
of the purchase price in one year. The sum in cash was paid
at the sale and the slaves were delivered to the defendant.
In a suit for the balance of the sales price the Statute was
raised as a defense, the defendant claiming that payment was
not due until one year after the sheriff's sale which was more
76. See citations under the different clauses of CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-101.
77. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 219 (1932); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 528 (rev. ed. 1936).
78. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 254 (1943) ; 49 AM. JUR., Statute
of Frauds § 497 (1943); Jones v. McMichael, 12 Rich. 176 (S. C. 1859);
Hillhouse v. Jennings, 60 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599 (1901) (employee hav-
ing started work).
79. See 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 459 (1950); see also note 6 supra (as
to land contracts).
80. 6 A. L. R. 2d 1053, 1111 (1949) ; 49 AM. Jun., Statute of Frauds §
497 (1943, Supp. 1957); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 504 (rev. ed. 1936);
2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 457 (1950).
81. Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. Cas. 5 (S. C. 1831); Compton v. Martin,
5 Rich. 14 (S. C. 1851) ; Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strob. 196 (S. C. 1848)
(charge to this effect by trial judge approved); Izard v. Middleton, 1
DeS. 116 (S. C. 1785) (overruled in part by a later case, but the law
of performance expressly affirmed).
82. 2 Bailey 614 (S. C. 1832).
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than a year from the date of the agreement. The Court, in
holding that delivery of the slaves was full performance on
plaintiff's part, said:
That part of the Statute, which requires a contract not
to be performed within the year to be in writing, has
been over and over again held to apply only to cases,
where the whole contract was executory; and not to cases,
where it had been performed by one of the parties.
This view of full performance on one side as removing the
case from the Statute logically follows the cases previously
discussed which held that the mere intention that full per-
formance on one side was to take place within the year was
sufficient to lift the bar of the Statute. Joseph v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co.8 3 was decided on this principle by the trial judge,
and in the light of other South Carolina cases on the point it
would appear to be a valid decision. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, reserved opinion on this point, finding the Statute in-
applicable for other reasons.
The cases so far discussed in this section have all involved
situations where full performance by one of the parties has
taken place within the year. From the opinions, however, it
may be inferred that full performance by one side, whenever
accomplished, takes a contract out of the Statute, and this
seems to be the rule adopted by most authorities. 84 Thus, it
is stated: 85
... the same result is and should be reached if the
plaintiff has fully performed, even though such full per-
formance was not completed within a year. There is
nothing in the Statute to require a distinction; and it is
the fact that full performance has been rendered that af-
fords a reason for enforcement, and not the time within
which it was rendered.
Despite one case, the law in South Carolina definitely seems
to support this view. The case is Carter v. Brown.8 6 Plain-
tiff alleged an oral agreement entered into in August, 1864,
whereby he agreed to serve the defendant as overseer during
the whole of the year 1865 in consideration of a certain
83. 224 S. C. 105, 77 S. E. 2d 583 (1953).
84. 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of § 254, p. 774 (1943); 49 Am. JUR.,
Statute of Frauds § 497 (1943, Supp. 1957) ; 6 A. L. R. 2d 1053, 1115
(1949). Contra, 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 504 (rev. ed. 1936).
85. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 457 (1950).
86. 3 S. C. 298 (1871).
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amount of cotton to be delivered to the plaintiff on January
1, 1866. The plaintiff sued on the contract as made and also
on a count of indebitatus assumpsit, alleging performance on
his part and failure on the part of defendant to deliver the
cotton. This contract clearly seems susceptible to the doctrine
here discussed, but the Court explained:
As this action can be supported on the implied promise
it is not necessary that the plaintiff should rest his de-
mand upon the original contract, which was affected by
the Statute of Frauds.
The opinion seems to declare that where there has been full
performance on one side, a new contract to pay for such per-
formance is implied and on that account the original contract
need not be enforced. While the Court purported to rest
its decision on the implied contract, it actually gave effect to
the original contract by allowing recovery not merely by re-
ferring to it to show that the services were rendered pursuant
to a contract, but by measuring the recovery by the terms of
the original contract. It is difficult to see how this case could
be held to militate against the doctrine of full performance
as removing the bar of the Statute, since previous cases
supporting this view were cited without criticism.8 7 In Walker
v. Railroad,s8 a case decided after the Carter case, the Court
refused to allow a defense of the Statute to a suit on a contract
originally within the Statute but which had been fully per-
formed by the plaintiff, although performance had extended
nine years from the date of the agreement. If there might
have been a misapprehension of Carter v. Brown, the rule was
nevertheless laid down in the Walker case that full perform-
ance long after the year would render the Statute inapplicable.
This view has also been adopted in subsequent cases. 9
None of the cases discussed in this section have mentioned
any requirement as to the type of performance necessary to
invoke the application of this rule. They have simply stated
that where the performance requested of the plaintiff has
been fully performed, the defendant cannot avail himself of
the Statute as a defense to a suit on the contract. The Court
87. Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. Cas. 5 (S. C. 1831); Bates v. Moore, 2
Bailey 614 (S. C. 1832); Compton v. Martin, 5 Rich. 14 (S. C. 1851).
88. 26 S. C. 80, 1 S. E. 866 (1887).
89. Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757, 76 Am!. ST. REP.
580 (1900) (5 years-decided on both performance and implied con-
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in the Carter case did say, in reference to cases allowing per-
formance on one part to remove the case from the Statute,
that:
It is certain that all these cases have been greatly in-
fluenced by the manifest injustice of allowing a party,
after having obtained the advantage of a contract, to fly
to a Statute, intended to prevent frauds, for impunity
in refusing performance of his corresponding obligation.
This must have been the portion of the opinion which the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sou. States Life Ins. Co.
v. Foster9" had in mind when the Carter case was cited in
support of its view that "nonaction is not such part perform-
ance 91 as exempts a contract from the Statute." The Court
held that an oral waiver of certain rights under a written con-
tract, pursuant to an agreement within the Statute, was not
such performance on one side as would remove the bar of the
Statute. The holding in this ease seems to be that the per-
formance rendered under the particular oral agreement sued
upon must be some positive action and not simply nonaction
which does not benefit or enrich the other party to the agree-
ment.
Keeping in mind the requirement of positive action set out
in this recent case, it may be said that the South Carolina cases
seem to be in accord with the American Law Institute's view:
"Promises in unilateral contracts are not within Class V
however long the time performance of them may require, and
promises in bilateral contracts as soon as they have been fully
performed on one side are withdrawn from the Class.
'9 2
WmLIAm L. POPE.
90. 229 F. 2d 77 (4th Cir. 195).
91. By the term "part performance' the Court undoubtedly meant the
same type of performance as has been referred to here as full perform-
ance on one side.
92. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 198, comment a (1932).
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